Vista Multiestrategia Fund and Vista Hedge Fund registered returns of -2.32% and -0.11% respectively in August and 50.27% and 20.82% respectively in 2022.

In August, the fund's result was affected by losses in oil and fixed income hedges. On the other side, hedges in currencies, iron ore, and the exposure to equities generated gains.

* * *

Oil, which remains the main position of the fund, continues to suffer from concerns on the demand side, even though US data does not support this diagnosis.



In the rest of the world, as previously discussed, we share the markets' fear of an adverse demand shock. Still, we disagree with the magnitude of the recession needed to generate a drop in total oil consumption. The need to convert gas into diesel in Europe, amid the biggest energy security crisis since the 1970s, is a further point that illustrates the complexity of the scenario and makes us believe that only a strong global recession would unbalance the oil market.

In China, the continuity of the Zero Covid policy and the collapse of the real estate market are very relevant topics for commodities demand in the short term. In the medium term, with the possible economy reopening and a growth model eventually more driven by consumption than by investment, a large-scale recession would also be necessary to bring negative net effects to oil consumption.

We remain comfortable with the current supply scenario. OPEP continues to signal that there is little idle capacity, Russia is likely to see some effect from recent sanctions and shale production continues to disappoint the market. In recent months, even with oil above US$ 80, the number of new wells drilled has been falling and net production in the year grows only marginally.

Finally, we remain alert regarding coming months with three important developments, namely: i) the end of the sale of the American strategic reserve; ii) the discussion around Zero Covid policy in China after the Communist Party plenary; iii) Putin's potential use of commodities as a weapon with the deepening of the war.

* * *

The long position in Brazilian stocks, another important allocation of our portfolio, had a very positive month, although our portfolio underperformed the index.

Still, without major electoral news or a clearer signal of what the reform agenda will be from 2023, we analyze the current moment of the cycle, where economic activity and public accounts continue to significantly surprise agents' expectations. We still have the same diagnosis that the commodities effects on our economic cycle are consistently underestimated.

On the fiscal side, the successive dodging of the spending ceiling, recent tax exemptions and the anticipation of court-ordered debt payments were eclipsed by the collection boom, partly explained by oil and other commodities.

Revenues from Natural Resources Exploration + Petrobras Dividends
% GDP, Cumulative over 12-month period



Source: Treasury, Vista Capital

In other words, the total revenue of the central government grew by more than 2 percentage points of GDP in relation to the pre-pandemic period, which contributed decisively to the primary surplus of the public sector in the last twelve months, with a current mark at an incredible 2.5% of GDP. Even with an interest expense of more than 6% of GDP, we have a nominal deficit of about 4% of GDP, certainly one of the lowest in the G20. And, while we understand the demands that exist on the spending side and the "fiscal pumps" left by the electoral cycle, we believe there is enough room to continue with a slightly positive primary result in 2023.

Certain of the challenges left for the next presidential cycle and the risk of being repetitive, we remain positive especially with Brazilian assets, which contrasts with a more prevalent skepticism among opinion formers and market agents.

The resilience of commodities, especially oil, the lagged effect of post-2016 economic reforms, and assets' discounted valuation are part of our optimism.

Moreover, the negative performance of domestic stocks against exporters, especially in recent months, moves towards agents tending to underestimate the economic cycle and, therefore, bring opportunities.

* * *

Considering that most of our risk allocation is still, directly or indirectly, exposed to the commodities cycle, our focus remains on seeking hedging for such assets.

"In other words, our convictions are much less balanced between supply and demand than they once were. Looking at it from another perspective, even if the situation of oil shortages in the world proves to be much more serious than expected, there is a pertinent doubt about the intensity of the slowdown in the global economy and the resulting impact on oil demand."

The above excerpt from our April monthly letter still reflects that our focus is on the search for hedges. Historically, the fixed income of developed countries would be a haven for protection against negative demand surprises. In a world of successive shocks, where high inflation and recession coexist as relevant risk factors, we have an intellectually challenging discussion.

On one hand, there are those who emphasize the higher inflationary pressure since the 1980s, still quite negative *ex-post* real interest, concerns about second-round effects of a tight labor market, and the conviction that the only way to deflate is through a pronounced tightening of financial conditions by central banks.

On the other hand, there are those who look at the contractionary effects of the reduction in real disposable income caused by the enormous shocks of 2022, especially in regions more vulnerable from an energy point of view. Added to this important factor are the "hangover" of the fiscal and monetary expansion from the pandemic, the significant improvement in the bottlenecks in global production chains, the important weaknesses of the Chinese economy, and the lagged effects of the global monetary tightening, felt especially by credit sensitive sectors.

On our side, we still have more doubts than certainties. Will developed central banks continue to explicitly prioritize the inflation convergence towards its targets when recession and unemployment eventually knocks on the door, especially in Europe? What will be the tolerance of central banks to a stronger rise in unemployment, especially when inflation has already shown clear signs of deceleration? If the service sector is labor- and energy-intensive, how will unemployment not rise with this strong relative price change underway? Does the recent small increase in unemployment in some developed countries indicate the beginning of a trend?

If doubts about the reaction function of the central banks do not seem sufficient, we also wonder what Europe's endgame will be. If the economy needs higher interest rates and then moves into a prolonged recession to deflate the effects of supply shocks and reduce demand for energy, what will be the risk premium of high debt countries, low potential growth, and abundant political risks like Italy?

On the positive side, there are also important doubts in the case of the European continent. Could the market be overly pessimistic with a problem that may prove temporary and that encompasses some of the richest countries on the planet? Does the eventual scenario of Ukrainian victory in the war and the solution of energy problems in a more benign way must be marked to zero in the distribution of scenarios?

Aware of the difficulty of having accurate answers to the above questions, we remain focused on the search for hedges that effectively correlate with our assets, something not observed in August.

We remain at your service.

Vista Capital

Vista Hedge FIC FIM

Year	Onshore			Offshore				Cash	Fees	Return	CDI
	Fixed Income	Equities	Currencies	Fixed Income	Equities	Currencies	*Commodities*				
2018	0,7%	7,6%	0,9%	-0,1%	0,3%	-0,7%	0,1%	3,8%	-2,9%	**9,6%**	4,1%
2019	0,0%	10,1%	-0,1%	-0,7%	-2,0%	-1,4%	1,0%	4,3%	-2,5%	**8,6%**	6,0%
2020	1,1%	3,0%	2,6%	-1,0%	4,7%	1,0%	1,8%	2,1%	-4,5%	**10,7%**	2,8%
2021	0,5%	0,5%	-1,6%	0,8%	2,3%	-1,3%	9,7%	3,3%	-3,2%	**11,0%**	4,4%
2022	0,3%	2,1%	1,3%	-0,5%	3,5%	2,1%	11,1%	6,3%	-5,6%	**20,8%**	7,7%
Jan	-0,3%	1,0%	0,3%	-0,1%	0,8%	-0,2%	1,5%	0,7%	-0,7%	**3,1%**	0,7%
Feb	-0,2%	-0,1%	0,0%	0,0%	-0,2%	-0,1%	2,9%	0,9%	-0,6%	**2,4%**	0,7%
Mar	0,8%	0,4%	0,4%	0,3%	-0,6%	0,0%	4,5%	0,5%	-1,3%	**5,1%**	0,9%
Apr	0,2%	-0,7%	0,1%	0,0%	0,9%	0,9%	1,7%	0,6%	-0,7%	**3,0%**	0,8%
May	0,0%	0,8%	0,0%	0,7%	0,8%	-0,3%	0,8%	0,8%	-0,7%	**2,9%**	1,0%
Jun	-0,4%	-0,3%	0,2%	-1,7%	0,8%	0,0%	-0,7%	0,7%	0,3%	**-1,1%**	1,0%
Jul	0,3%	0,8%	0,0%	1,7%	0,3%	1,0%	0,3%	0,6%	-0,8%	**4,1%**	1,0%
Aug	-0,1%	0,1%	0,1%	-1,2%	0,2%	0,5%	-0,4%	0,9%	-0,1%	**-0,1%**	1,2%

Vista Multiestratégia FIC FIM

Year	Onshore			Offshore				Cash	Fees	Return	CDI
	Fixed Income	Equities	Currencies	Fixed Income	Equities	Currencies	*Commodities*				
2015	-0,8%	6,7%	16,4%	0,0%	1,5%	2,9%	0,3%	16,8%	-8,1%	**35,7%**	12,2%
2016	4,0%	27,8%	-3,0%	1,9%	1,5%	4,0%	0,3%	14,1%	-9,4%	**41,3%**	14,0%
2017	2,6%	-1,9%	-3,7%	1,4%	6,9%	-1,8%	0,0%	5,2%	-3,1%	**5,6%**	10,0%
2018	1,3%	37,0%	2,8%	0,3%	4,8%	-2,4%	0,3%	4,3%	-10,0%	**38,4%**	6,4%
2019	-0,5%	25,9%	0,7%	-2,0%	-6,6%	-3,8%	2,5%	2,4%	-5,7%	**12,8%**	6,0%
2020	3,3%	9,1%	7,9%	-3,0%	14,2%	2,9%	5,3%	0,9%	-10,4%	**30,2%**	2,8%
2021	-0,1%	1,7%	-5,1%	2,7%	5,7%	-4,4%	32,7%	2,0%	-7,9%	**27,2%**	4,4%
2022	0,9%	6,1%	4,4%	-3,4%	12,7%	7,4%	34,5%	1,6%	-14,0%	**50,3%**	7,7%
Jan	-0,9%	3,1%	1,1%	-0,4%	2,5%	-0,5%	4,5%	0,3%	-2,2%	**7,4%**	0,7%
Feb	-0,5%	-0,4%	0,0%	-0,1%	-0,8%	-0,3%	8,6%	0,3%	-1,5%	**5,2%**	0,7%
Mar	2,3%	1,3%	1,5%	0,9%	-1,8%	0,0%	12,3%	0,1%	-3,5%	**13,1%**	0,9%
Apr	0,6%	-2,3%	0,3%	0,0%	2,8%	2,7%	5,3%	0,1%	-1,8%	**7,7%**	0,8%
May	-0,1%	2,3%	0,1%	2,1%	2,6%	-1,0%	2,4%	0,1%	-1,7%	**6,7%**	1,0%
Jun	-1,2%	-1,1%	0,5%	-5,5%	2,5%	0,0%	-1,7%	0,2%	1,0%	**-5,2%**	1,0%
Jul	1,1%	2,2%	0,1%	5,0%	0,9%	3,0%	0,7%	0,1%	-2,4%	**10,6%**	1,0%
Aug	-0,4%	0,3%	0,2%	-3,6%	0,6%	1,2%	-1,1%	0,1%	0,3%	**-2,3%**	1,2%